Maintenance of Residential Rental Property: An Empirical Analysis by Thomas M. Springer & Neil G. Waller
Introduction
Real estate investors and property managers alike have an interest in monitoring the level
and the costs of property maintenance. In the short run, property maintenance increases
operating expenses and lowers proﬁtability. In the long run, maintaining a property
stabilizes the quality of the structure by reducing the rate of economic depreciation, thus
supporting future rent levels. Knowledge of the level of maintenance activity leads to a
better understanding of rental housing quality management by property owners and their
agents.
In this paper, a model of rental property maintenance activity is developed and
empirically tested using annual maintenance cost as a proxy for the level of maintenance
activity. The data describe characteristics of 137 rental properties, including apartments,
condominiums, single-family houses, and townhouses. Maintenance cost variability is
attributable to physical property features, local rental market characteristics, tenant-
related factors, and property management considerations.
The results show that maintenance costs vary considerably with many of the variables.
Increases in maintenance costs are consistent with increased age, higher tenant turnover
rates, the presence of air conditioning, more bathrooms per unit, higher rent per square
foot, and the subcontracting of the maintenance work. Apartments have higher
maintenance costs per square foot than other property types. Housing complexes with
more units exhibit lower per square foot maintenance costs than those with fewer units.
Also, maintenance costs are higher for properties whose owners own multiple properties.
Finally, the results show that the number of rental units per project under the same
management and absentee ownership do not signiﬁcantly affect maintenance costs.
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Abstract. The maintenance costs of 137 residential rental properties in northwestern South
Carolina are analyzed. The results show that maintenance cost per square foot increases
with property age, tenant turnover, certain amenities, and for higher-rent properties.
Compared to other property types, apartments exhibit higher maintenance costs per square
foot with larger complexes showing lower per square foot maintenance costs than smaller
complexes. This cost economy suggests added value to rental housing for larger complexes.
Owners of multiple properties are found to pay higher maintenance costs. Finally, there is
no observed relationship between absentee ownership and the level of property maintenance.A Model of Residential Property Maintenance
Whether by direct participation or indirectly through a property manager, a rational
wealth-maximizing real estate investor monitors and controls property rent and expense
levels. A properly motivated property manager has the goal of maximizing the wealth of the
owner/investor. Improper managerial motivation, whether the result of a poorly designed
property management contract or a consequence of the physical separation of ownership
and management, can lead to a divergence of the goals of the manager from those of the
owner.1 Maintenance activity, as inﬂuenced by the wealth-maximization strategy and
managerial motivation, is a crucial part of residential real estate investment in both the
short run, with its impact on proﬁtability, and the long run, with its effect on quality.
The level of property maintenance and the associated maintenance cost interrelate with
housing quality and rent levels. A higher level of quality is associated with higher rents
and requires more maintenance activity. Many academic studies of housing depreciation
(see, for example, Dildine and Massey, 1974; Read, 1991) analyze the relationships
between housing quality, rent levels and the level of property maintenance. Rent is a
common proxy for housing quality. Ceteris paribus, a decline in rent evidences a decline
in housing quality, and vice versa. Factors that affect rent logically affect housing
quality.2 The quality of housing, Q,
Q5f(C0, It, M) , (1)
is a function of C0, physical property characteristics at the time of construction; It,
additional capital investment since construction; and M, both current and past levels of
maintenance activity (Arnott, Davidson and Pines, 1983). Because C0 is variant, changes
in Q result from investment decisions (It) subsequent to the time of construction and
ongoing maintenance activity (M), which affects the physical deterioration of C0.
At any time, maintaining a desired level of quality, Qd, requires a given level of
maintenance activity. Changes in the demand for rental housing affect rent and can cause
changes to Qd, thus affecting the level of maintenance activity. Economic theory (see, for
example, Vorst, 1987) suggests an optimal level of maintenance activity at which the
owner’s wealth is maximized. This optimal level of property maintenance varies over
time, as economic conditions change and as the housing unit depreciates. Assuming that
the desired level of housing quality, Qd, is optimal to maximizing the wealth of the
property owner, the associated level of maintenance activity, Md, of the landlord is 
Md5f(Qd, C, D, Mg) , (2)
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Exhibit 1
Breakdown of the Data by Property Type
Property Type
Single-Family
Apartments Houses Condominiums Total
Observations 38 42 57 137
Units 269 42 57 383
Source: Authors’ analysiswhere C are physical property characteristics; D are current demand characteristics; and
Mg are factors relating to property management.
While optimal maintenance is a goal, actual activity can reﬂect either under-
maintenance or overmaintenance of the rental property. Some maintenance costs are
unavoidable and independent of the level of quality. For example, maintenance expenses
required to maintain habitability, namely health or safety concerns, are nondiscretionary
unless termination of the rental activity is the wealth-maximizing choice. Other
maintenance costs are incurred voluntarily and reﬂect a conscious attempt by the owner
to enhance rents by increasing either the quality of the housing stock or the level of the
offered amenities. Assuming that all owners operate at Qd and that maintenance costs per
square foot, MC, proxy for maintenance activity, Md, we test the model:
MC5f (C, D, Mg)1e , (3)
where C, D and Mg are vectors of property, market and managerial characteristics and e
is a random error vector.3
Determinants of Maintenance Cost Variability
Many factors contribute to the variability of maintenance costs across residential rental
properties. These factors include physical characteristics of the property, including
structural features and optional amenities; demand characteristics, including certain
features of the local rental market; and property management factors. Property
management factors can include differences in both actual management practices and the
relationship between the manager and the property owner.
Age often proxies for the economic depreciation of a real estate asset. The relationship
between age and housing quality, and the consequent relationship to maintenance
activity, varies with the type of property and both the time and method of construction.
For example, apartment units are typically smaller than single-family houses and are
expected to have higher maintenance costs per square foot. Vintage effects (Randolph,
1988), resulting from variability in construction techniques across property types over
time, cause properties to age differently.4 For instance, ﬂimsier construction depreciates
more rapidly and requires a higher level of maintenance activity to sustain the quality of
the rental property. Conversely, better quality construction requires less activity to
maintain the same relative housing quality.
As properties age they become more costly to maintain. Also, holding housing quality
and demand constant, an older property generates less rent per square foot relative to a
newer property. A landlord must continually decide whether to maintain quality and
incur higher costs or to increase short-term proﬁtability by reducing maintenance activity
and lowering quality. The landlord’s decision evolves from the trade-off among housing
quality, rent and maintenance activity.
The injection of additional capital into an older property alters the relationship
between age and maintenance costs. The renovation of an older property can impact both
the quality and the appearance of the property. However, the impact of a renovation
upon property maintenance costs is unclear because the renovation can be intended to
reduce future maintenance costs or to upgrade housing quality to increase competitive-
ness and rental income. Randolph (1988) notes the impact of renovation on the age/rent
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(1990) incorporate capital expenditures as a proxy for the age effect and ﬁnd that
operating expenses increase with capital expenditure, thus with age.
The amenity package included in the rental unit affects maintenance costs. Amenities
can include appliances and quality space. By choosing to provide amenities in the rental
package, a landlord must consider whether the additional costs, including the
incremental increase to maintenance costs, are justiﬁable in comparison to increases to
rental income. For instance, given that the value of the incremental rent increase justiﬁes
the investment, the addition of an extra bathroom may not be justiﬁable when potential
increases in maintenance are considered. Frequently, the addition of the amenity does
not increase rent but serves to keep the property competitive at existing rent levels. For
instance, in many markets air conditioning is considered virtually essential.
Clientele characteristics, such as the type of tenant or characteristics of the local rental
market, can affect maintenance expenditures. A property whose tenants turn over more
frequently requires more maintenance. Also, rental housing demand is segmented by the
level of rent charged for a speciﬁc housing unit. The rent of a housing unit not only
proxies for the quality of the property and the neighborhood, but also for tenant income.
However, a high rent may also be coincident with more tenants per unit. Rosenberg and
Corgel (1990) ﬁnd that both tenant turnover and rent levels have a positive impact on
rental operating expenses.
The local rental housing market may be segmented by property types, as well as rent
levels. Maintenance costs per square foot are expected to be higher for apartments not
only because of their typically smaller size, but because they serve a different clientele.
Differences may also exist for condominiums, single-family homes and townhouses.
Finally, within the localized market, there may be neighborhood effects. Properties,
located in neighborhoods that are perceived to be of better quality, may require greater
upkeep. An example would be the effort dedicated to yard care and landscaping or the
frequency of exterior painting. Wang, Grissom, Webb, and Spellman (1991) study
differences in selling prices between single-family rental properties and single-family
residences within the same neighborhood and ﬁnd evidence for both quality deterior-
ation of rental properties and a ‘‘neighborhood’’ effect whereby the density of rental
homes has a negative effect on selling prices.
Agency costs can arise from the contractual or physical separation of the owner from
the manager.5 In the case of geographic separation of ownership and management, the
owner’s costs of monitoring and control increase dramatically with the distance
separating the owner from the manager. Also, because the property manager, as a leasing
agent, receives income when an apartment is initially rented, the manager is motivated to
higher tenant turnover, not necessarily to an optimal maintenance policy or to a tenant
base that is less risky.
Agency effects may also arise when a single property owner has multiple properties
under the same property manager. Owners of multiple properties tend to be more
sophisticated in their real estate and investment knowledge. They are more likely to exert
their inﬂuence on the property manager and to maintain the property optimally.
Although the monitoring costs of ownership are higher because of the multiple owner-
ship, the per property monitoring costs are lower with the use of a single manager.
Whether or not the property manager subcontracts the maintenance work may affect
the level of maintenance expenditures. Inefﬁcient documentation of expenses can result in
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maintenance employees may not report many tasks. However, in-house maintenance
employees often are assigned to make-work projects or may otherwise be under-
employed, resulting in overmaintenance and higher maintenance expenses. Finally, with
the variable expense structure coincident with subcontracting, maintenance priorities
may change so that only major problems are handled, thus resulting in a quality loss.
Finally, there is a possible economy-of-scale effect when a manager has multiple units
under a management contract. The manager can lower maintenance costs because of
increased operational efﬁciency. Economies of scale are also expected for large housing
complexes relative to smaller complexes or solitary housing units. Rosenberg and Corgel
(1990) ﬁnd mixed results for the impact that the number of units per project has on
operating expenses.
The Data
To estimate the residential rental property maintenance model, data were collected from
137 rental properties, including apartments, condominiums, single-family houses, and
townhouses, located in northwestern South Carolina. For each rental property, the 1990
annual maintenance cost and other attributes were collected.
The 137 rental properties include a total of 383 rental housing units (see Exhibit 1).
Fifty-seven of the observations are houses. Thirty-eight apartment complexes having a
total of 269 rental units are represented. The remaining 42 observations are for
condominiums and townhouses. All of the properties are professionally managed by one
of three local real estate ﬁrms. Several rental housing complexes have multiple managers,
reﬂecting condominium ownership of individual units.
The independent variables are:
Air Conditioning 1 if air conditioning is present, 0 otherwise;
Age the age of the property in years; 
Appearance 1 if the condition and appearance of the property is rated
good or better by the property manager, 0 otherwise;
Appliances 1 if the unit contains a dishwasher, a clothes washer and
dryer, a refrigerator, and a range, 0 otherwise;
Bathrooms the number of bathrooms in the rental unit;
Renovated 1 indicates evidence of renovation, 0 no evidence;
Apartment 1 indicates an apartment, 0 other housing type;
Condominium 1 indicates a condominium, 0 other housing type;
Townhouse 1 indicates a townhouse, 0 other housing type;
Large Complex 1 indicates a housing complex of thirty or more units, 0
otherwise;
Neighborhood 1 if the neighborhood where the property is located is
rated good or better by the property manager; otherwise
0;
Rent/Sq. Ft annual unit rent per square foot;
Turnover the annual frequency of tenant change for a rental unit;
Absentee Owner 1 if owner lives more than seventy miles away, 0 other-
wise;
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same owner;
Owner/Manager 1 if the property is owned by the property manager, 0
otherwise;
Subcontractor 1 if property manager subcontracts maintenance work, 0
otherwise;
Units Managed the number of housing units under single management.6
Speciﬁcally, maintenance costs are the costs of maintaining a housing unit and do not
include property taxes, utilities, insurance, replacement reserves, advertising expenses,
and capital expenditures.7 Maintenance costs are expected to increase with increasing,
Age, Bathrooms, Turnover and Rent/Sq.Ft. For the binary variables, Air Conditioning,
Appearance, Appliances, Apartment, Neighborhood, and Absentee Owner are expected to
have positive coefﬁcients. Maintenance costs are expected to decrease with increasing
Units Managed, for larger housing complexes and if the property shows evidence of
having been renovated. The data are summarized in Exhibit 2, with Panel A showing
summary statistics and Panel B the correlation matrix for the nonbinary variables.
Results
The model of residential rental property maintenance is estimated using the previously
described data. The dependent variable is the 1990 maintenance cost per square foot. To
account for nonlinearity, the continuous variables, Age and Rent/Sq.Ft are modeled in
the logarithmic form. A revised covariance estimator (White, 1980) corrects for
heteroskedasticity with a Breusch-Pagan test statistic verifying the correction.8 The
impact of outliers is assessed by reestimating the model after removing extreme values of
Maintenance Cost and Rent/Sq.Ft. The outliers do not substantially affect the results.
The stability of the model is evaluated by testing alternative speciﬁcations. Generally, the
following results are stable with respect to the signs, signiﬁcance and the relative
magnitude of the coefﬁcients.
The results (Exhibit 3) show that the selected variables effectively represent the factors
inﬂuencing the variability of maintenance costs across rental units. The F-ratio for the
model is statistically signiﬁcant, indicating rejection of the null hypothesis that the
combined inﬂuence of the variables is zero. The coefﬁcients for ten of eighteen
independent variables are signiﬁcant at better than a 10% signiﬁcance level. Excepting
Appliances, all of the signiﬁcant coefﬁcients have the expected sign. As evidenced by an
adjusted-R2 of .394 the model explains approximately 40% of the variability in rental
property maintenance costs.
The positive coefﬁcient on Age shows an age effect consistent with expectations.
Maintenance costs increase with age, but at a decreasing rate. Sensitivity analysis using
the results shows that ceteris paribus, for properties over eighteen years of age, based on
the impact of age alone, expected maintenance costs as predicted by the model increase
less than $.01 per square foot per year of age. Surprisingly, the results indicate that
renovation of a property has no signiﬁcant impact on maintenance costs. The
insigniﬁcance of Renovated may be a result of measurement error. The variable accounts
for evidence of a renovation, but does not consider the timing, the extent, or the quality
of the renovation. Theoretically, additional capital investment, such as renovation, shifts
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Exhibit 2A
Descriptive Statistics of the Data
Std 
Mean Dev. Minimum Median Maximum Units of Measure
Maintenance Costs .5637 .6677 0 .3318 4.7640 Dollars per sq. ft per
year
Air Conditioning .9124 .2837 0 1 1 1 if present
Age 19.9120 15.3730 1 15 91 Number of years
Appearance .4453 .4988 0 0 1 1 if good or better
Appliances .1971 .3993 0 0 1 1 if present
Bathrooms 1.6946 .6162 1 2 3 Number per unit
Renovated .0949 .2941 0 0 1 1 if renovated
Apartment .2774 .4493 0 0 1 1 if an apartment
Condominium .2117 .4100 0 0 1 1 if a condominium
Townhouse .1022 .3040 0 0 1 1 if a townhouse
Rent/Sq.Ft 5.8882 4.3821 1.9940 4.7957 49.0900 Dollars per sq. ft per
year
Neighborhood .4599 .5002 0 0 1 1 if good or better
Turnover .4872 .4440 0 .5 1 Percentage of units
turned over
Absentee Owner .4745 .5012 0 0 1 1 if owner lives more
than 70 miles from
unit
Multiple Properties 1.3869 .9255 1 1 5 Number per owner
Owner/Manager .0365 .1882 0 0 1 1 if the owner is the
manager
Subcontractor .7226 .4493 0 1 1 1 if management is
subcontracted
Large Complex .1606 .3685 0 0 1 1 if complex has more
than 30 units
Units Managed 2.7956 5.0848 1 1 32 Number per manager
Exhibit 2B
Correlation Matrix of Selected Nonbinary Variables
Maintenance Rent/ Multiple Units
Variables Costs Sq.Ft Age Bathrooms Properties Managed Turnover
Maintenance Costs 1.000
Rent/Sq.Ft .446 1.000
Age 2.000 2.289 1.000
Bathrooms 2.097 .187 2.314 1.000
Multiple Properties .258 2.125 .151 2.275 1.000
Units Managed .056 .047 2.059 2.300 .253 1.000
Turnover .177 .062 .082 2.077 .062 2.084 1.000
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Exhibit 3
Estimated Results for the Property Maintenance Costs Modela,b
Variable Coefﬁcient (Std Error)
Intercept 22.6475*
(.5625)




































aStandard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity, are in parentheses. The Breusch-Pagan Chi-
squared value is 78.49 with 18 degrees of freedom. An asterisk (*) indicates statistical signiﬁcance
at 10% or better. 
bThe model has an adjusted-R2 of .394. The F-statistic has a value of 5.92, with 18 and 118 degrees
of freedom.
Source: Authors’ analysisthe property to an earlier point on the age, or depreciation, function. Given evidence of
the stabilization of maintenance costs beyond a certain age, the most critical factor of the
renovation may be its timing. That is, if the renovation is done on a property that is
sufﬁciently old, reductions in maintenance costs may be either negligible or for a shorter
duration.
The physical property characteristics describing amenities show mixed results. A rental
unit with air conditioning has higher maintenance costs relative to one with no air
conditioning. Also, additional bathrooms increase maintenance costs. A somewhat
unexpected result is the wrong sign of the Appliances coefﬁcient, especially given its
relatively large magnitude. The results suggest that a complete set of modern appliances,
namely a dishwasher, a clothes washer and dryer, a refrigerator, and a range, lowers the
maintenance costs of a residential rental property. An analysis of the subset of the data
including properties having a complete set of appliances shows that, relative to the full
sample, these properties are newer, in better condition, located in better neighborhoods,
and less likely to be an apartment. Given these characteristics, Appliances seems to proxy
for better maintained or higher quality rental units, in which case the estimated
coefﬁcient has the correct sign.
Maintenance costs (per square foot) are signiﬁcantly higher for apartments relative to
other property types. The additional maintenance cost per square foot is not surprising
given the smaller unit size of apartments relative to the other property types included in
the sample, namely townhouses, condominiums and single-family homes. The apartment
subset shows, that relative to the full sample, apartments provide fewer appliances, are in
a perceived worse condition and are located in neighborhoods perceived to be of lower
quality.9 The results provide evidence that scale economies exist for large housing
complexes (Large Complex). The combined effect of these two variables, Apartment and
Large Complex, implies that as the number of units increases, maintenance cost per
square foot increases at a decreasing rate. Our results provide support for Rosenberg and
Corgel’s (1990) ﬁnding that operating expenses per square foot are higher for smaller
apartment projects.
Higher tenant turnover signiﬁcantly increases maintenance expenses. All else held
constant, sensitivity analysis shows that a doubling of tenant turnover from the average
increases maintenance costs per square foot to $.878 from $.743 (the estimated
maintenance cost at the data means), an 18% increase, while halving tenant turnover
reduces maintenance costs to $.676 per square foot, a 10% decrease. Because tenant
stability reduces maintenance costs, this result provides justiﬁcation for rent reductions,
or restrictions of rent increases, for continuing tenants relative to new tenants.10
The results suggest that when a subcontractor is used, maintenance costs are
substantially higher than when the property management ﬁrm does its own maintenance
work. Reporting and accounting methods could explain the differences. Perhaps, ‘‘in
house’’ maintenance employees of the property management ﬁrm fail to record many of
their minor activities. The results show no differences in maintenance costs for properties
that are managed by their owner.
Finally, based on the insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient for Absentee Owner, the model suggests
no geographic agency effects. It is likely that any agency effects from absentee ownership
would be evidenced by increased tenant turnover or more damages. Because managers
are often compensated based on securing a lease, there is potential motivation towards
faster tenant turnover, which corresponds to accelerated leasing activity. Also, because of
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careful tenant screening and selection standards. The net result would be evidenced by
increased property damages, relative to increased maintenance costs.
Although there is a strongly signiﬁcant and positive relationship between rent and
maintenance costs, an overly speciﬁc interpretation of this result is impractical because
Rent/Sq.Ft can proxy for many property, demand and property management factors.
Also, compared to the observed scale economies associated with large apartment
complexes, there is no statistical support of reduced maintenance costs from scale
economies to the property manager resulting from multiple units under management
(Units Managed). At least from this sample, it is apparent that large property managers
are no more operationally efﬁcient than small property managers.
Conclusions
The results of the model of maintenance costs for residential rental properties show that
the variability of maintenance costs across rental properties can be effectively explained.
The model shows that maintenance costs per square foot increase with age, increased
tenant turnover and the presence of certain amenities. Apartments and rentals charging
higher rent also exhibit higher maintenance costs per square foot.
Notably, there is no evidence of agency problems associated with absentee ownership.
That is, there is no signiﬁcant difference in maintenance cost between local and absentee
owners. Also, larger apartment complexes exhibit economies of scale evidenced by lower
maintenance costs per square foot. There is direct implication that large ownerships, such
as large apartment complexes, add value to housing. Finally, owners of multiple
properties evidence a higher level of maintenance costs. This result suggests that either
the owners are more attentive to the properties or that there is a tenant selection
difference compared to owners of single properties.
The results of this paper lead to a better understanding of housing quality
maintenance, maintenance expenses, and property manager decisionmaking. A possible
extension of the work is to collect a time-series and estimate a generalized model
incorporating contemporaneous changes. A signiﬁcant contribution would be a similar
model estimated with more diverse data, perhaps collected from a major metropolitan
area. Also, tenant damages, which are more tenant-speciﬁc, can be compared to
maintenance costs, which are more property-speciﬁc.
Notes
1The ﬁnance literature is replete with papers on agency relationships and costs. See Solt and Miller
(1985) and Rosenberg and Corgel (1990) for real estate applications.
2The literature extensively covers the determinants of real estate rent. See Sirmans and Benjamin
(1991) for a relatively current review.
3We relax the maintenance of housing quality assumption commonly used in the literature (for
example, Rosenberg and Corgel, 1990). Thus, Qd varies given different property, market or
ownership characteristics.
4Randolph (1988) interprets age as an estimate of depreciation that is biased because of vintage
effects, which occur when age-invariant rent determinants correlate with the year of construction.
To the extent that housing units age differently because of these vintage effects, the same bias exists
in this study.
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ﬁnancial motivations not handled by existing standard management contracts. These agency costs
relate to the concentration of ownership of the apartment complex and the degree of competition
for property management services.
6Single-family homes take a value of 1. For housing types occurring in multiple unit complexes, the
variable describes the number of units under single management, not the number of units in the
complex.
7To our knowledge, our maintenance cost measure is consistent with Rosenberg and Corgel’s (1990)
operating expense measure except that we do not include advertising costs. The MSA effect studied
by Rosenberg and Corgel is invariant because all properties are in the same geographic area.
8We used LIMDEP to estimate the model. The heteroskedasticity correction is an additional
command.
9Also, as indicated by the number of tenants signing the lease and higher turnover rates, apartments
are used more intensively relative to the other housing types. An excess of missing values precludes
including the number of tenants per unit as explanatory variable.
10We also separated the sample into high and low turnover properties. A comparison of the
regressions on the subsamples show some differences. Notably, for low turnover properties, the
number of units managed is signiﬁcant and positive and, for high turnover properties, Age is
insigniﬁcant.
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